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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MERLENE LODDER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
7809

WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY and RICHARD WHITE,
Defendants and Appellants.

Respondendent's

Brief

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The rather brief Statement of Facts contained at
pages 1 to 5 of Appellants' brief is not controverted
excepting in the following particulars:
Plaintiff's amended and supplemental Complaint
does not "repeat" the allegations of injuries stated in
the original Complaint, but properly reveals that,
since the time of the original Complaint, Plaintiff had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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experienced additional and long continuing symptoms which indicated a permanent neck injury CR. 2,
28).
Second South Street at the point of the intersection in question is not 132 feet wide but is 93 feet
wide fro1n curb to curb CR. 53, Ex. A). The distance
from the south curb line to the crossing watchman's
shack is an additional 43 feet south CR. 53, Ex. A.).
The first switch north of Second South is not 55 feet
north but 64 feet from the north curb line CR. 53,
Ex. A). The second switch north of Second South is
not 170 feet north of Second South but 201 feet north
of the north curb line CR. 53, Ex. A); the second
switch is 137 feet north of the first switch CR. 53,
Ex. A). The third switch is 741h feet north of the
second switch, a total of 2751h feet north of the north
curb line of Second South.
Although Mr. White testified CR. 198) that the
locomotive approached the intersection at 5 or 6 miles
an hour, Mr. Bond testified CR. 246) that the locomotive was going 7 or 8 miles an hour.
Mr. Bond did not testify that the rear of the
locomotive was a few feet north of the north line of
Second South when he looked east and saw plaintiff's
autom:~bile. He does testify that the locomotive was
in that position when he first gave a "wash-out"
signal to the hostler CR. 234) . Mr. Bond testified
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
p. 2+5) that his first glance "·here he could see up the
street was by the No. + switch, which was 64 feet
north of the north curb line and was 33~ feet north
of the sidewalk.
Mr. Lodder testified that he first saw the locomotive 'vhen he was within about four or five car
lengths of the tracks ( R. 69, 84), not five or six, as
Appellants state. The automobile was dragged 36
feet by the locomotive before it was disengaged ( R.
196, 252). Exhibit 1 shows the nature and extent of
the damage caused to the automobile by the collision.
Plaintiff's injuries were received not only by
striking her head against the automobile but in the
snapping or whiplash motion which caused her
sprained neck ( R. 131 ) .

This brief statement of facts is not, however,
relied on either by Appellants or Respondent as adequate to fully inform the Court as to the circumstances surrounding the accident and injury.
Throughout their brief, Appellants have referred to
the facts in detail as they have considered some eight
points of appeal. Respondent has done likewise ·in
the hope that, by such a treatment of the facts, the
Court will be better assisted in fairly appraising the
facts.
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Statement of Points

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE ACTIONABLE
NEGLIGENCE.
II and Ill

THE VERDICT WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.
IV
THE COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED ALL MATERIAL ISSUES
AND INSTRUCTED ON THEM.

v
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE
QUESTION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE.
VI
THE ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE JURY WERE ALL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

1

i,P.:
1ara

VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANTS TO. THE TIME LIMIT FOR CLOSING ARGUMENT
WHICH THEY VOLUNTARILY AGREED UPON.
VIII
THE VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DID NOT INDICATE PASSION, PREJUDICE OR CORRUPTION.
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Point I
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO PROVE
ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE

Respondent contends and respectfully submits
that the evidence is amply sufficient to prove actionable negligence on the part of both appellants.
Before takin-g up the three types of negligence
relied on, Respondent wishes to make the record clear
on the point raised at p. 8 of Appellants' Brief. It
is not true that Respondent does "not claim or assert
that either of the railroads or their servants failed or
neglected to give any signal or warning required by
any statute or ordinance." Defendants submitted as
an interrogatory (R. p. 7) the question, "What particular and specific wilful, reckless negligent and
unlawful acts does each of the plaintiffs refer to and
claim that the D. & R. G. was and is guilty of in
Para. 1, of the complaint?" To this, plaintiffs answered (R. p. 10.) among other things, "That its
servant and employee, Richard White, was then and
t}:lere acting as the engineer in charge of the backward movement of said diesel locomotive and in the
course of his said employment, negligently and unlawfully failed and neglected*** to cause the whistle
or horn of said locomotive to be sounded (as the locomotive approached the intersection of 2nd South and
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4th West Streets) notwithstanding at the said time
and place it was dark and snow was falling."
It was not necessary to plead more specifically
the applicability of Section 77-0-14, U. C. A. 1943, as
amended by L. Utah 1943, Ch. 82, Sec. 1, p. 124.
This statute required the defendants under these circumstances to sound the locomotive whistle before
entering the· crossing on penalty of being guilty of a
misdemeanor plus liability "for all damages which
any person may sustain by reason of such violation."
THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO KEEP THE LOOKOUT OF
REASONABLE, PRUDENT PERSONS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

Quite the contrary of Appellants' position, Respondent submits that the trial court was warranted
in submitting the issue of negligent failure to maintain a lookout on three separate and independent
factual grounds, as follows:
(1)

The hostler's helper, Mr. Bond, either did not
see and observe the Ladder car as soon as it was
possible to do so, or else he negligently failed to give
the signal to the hostler as soon as he did see the car.
Since it took the hostler plus his helper to keep
a lookout, (Br. p. 10) and since the helper's signal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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\vas part of the method by which the lookout was
kept, failure to promptly signal would be tantamount
to a negligent failure to keep a lookout. The helper
was the "eyes" through which the engineer was
obliged to "see."
The hostler's helper, Mr. Bond, testified that
he saw the Lodder car when it was approximately
200 feet east of the tracks, ( R. p. 233, 245) He then
testified that the locomotive moved fifty to fifty-five
feet from the point where he, Bond, jumped and signalled to the point of collision ( R. p. 246) ; but that
the locomotive moved two car lengths or approximately ninety feet from the point where he first saw
the car to the point of collision (R. p. 246.) He carefully makes the distinction between the point where
he first saw the car, and the point where he jumped.
( R. p. 246) He did not signal until after or as he
jumped. (R. 233.) He knew in his mind there was
going to be a collision the moment he first observed
the car. ( R. p. 233) . The train was moving seven or
eight miles an hour. (R. p. 246.)
If Bond did not jump and signal for thirty-five
to forty feet after he first saw the car and knew of
the danger, he waited (assuming 10 feet per second)
three and one-half or four seconds, before he gave the
warning. Normal reaction time at seven or eight
miles an hour is not more than ten· to twelve feet.
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From this testimony, the jury could reasonably
conclude either that Bond did not jump and signal
within a reasonable time after seeing the car, or that
he did not in fact see the car as soon as it could be
seen because he failed to keep a proper lookout?
The same point is perhaps even more graphically demonstrated by another aspect of Mr. Bond's
testimony, as follows:
Bond testified that when he jumped he lit right
on the sidewalk at the curb line. <R. p. 246) But
he says that he was at or by the No.4 switch when
he first saw the Ladder car. (R. p. 245) The distance
from the curb line to the first switch north of the
street is sixty-four feet. (Ex. A., R. p. 52.) If the
jury accepted this testimony of Bond's, then it must
have concluded he waited two thirds of the distance
from the point where the car was first seen to the
point of collision (said by Bond to be approximately
90 feet (R. p. 246), before jumping and signalling.
Or else he did not actually see the car when he says
he did, i. e. when he first could have seen it back by
the first switch north of second south. (Appellants
agree at p. 10 of their brief that Bond first had an
opportunity to observe and did in fact first see the
Lodder car when "the rear of the locomotive was
about at the switch nearest Second South." For this
they cite R. p. 243, but no language on that page
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seems to bear on the point.) (Note also that Bond repeatedly refers to the first switch north of Second
South as ''No.+ switch.") (R. 243, 245.)
Since Bond also testified (though somewhat
more indefinitely) that he jumped and signalled
"vhen he first saw the Lodder car, (R. p. 233, 245) the
jury might 'veil conclude that he did not see it till
he \vas nearly at the curb line, and hence did not
keep a proper lookout, else he would have seen it at
the first switch.

(2)

The Hostler, Mr. White, either failed to keep a
lookout or negligently failed to respond to the wash
out signal given by Mr. Bond.
Mr. White, the hostler, testified on direct (R. p.
199) and also on cross (R. p. 220) that the locomotive
in question could be stopped at this intersection on
the rails in the condition prevailing the night of the
accident, in sixty to seventy feet. Notwithstanding
this fact, Mr. White admitted (R. p. 220) that it took
him ninety feet to stop after he began to apply the
air brakes. There is no explanation tendered for
this inconsistency. Mr. White says he was only
going five or six miles per hour at the time he entered
the intersection (R. p. 220) and that he applied the
independent air the moment he saw Bond jump, (R.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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p. 219) and applied the emergency air and sand the
moment he saw the car coming into sight (R. p. 221)
and that he had already seen Bond jump before he
saw the car ( R. p. 219). Officer Farnsworth testified
( R. p. 252) that the street is ninety feet wide, that
the point of collision was thirty feet south of the
north curb line, and that the locomotive moved sixtyone feet after the impact.
The jury could have concluded from these facts
that Mr. White did not stop in the sixty to seventy
feet that was possible, because he was not aware of
the signal or the approach of the Lodder car until he
was already into the intersection. At the very least
there is a clear split between Bond's testimony and
White's. The physical facts show that the car could
be seen by Bond before the rear end of the locomotive
on which he was standing came to the sidewalk and
Bond insisted he first saw it 200 feet east of the track.
If Bond signalled when he first saw or could have
seen, then White was not looking or he could have
stopped short of the point of collision. It was not for
the court to reconcile these inconsistencies-the issue
of reasonable lookout was properly submitted to the
jury for its determination.
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(3)

A reasonable lookout under the circumstances
would have included an observance of the position
and signals of the crossing watchman.
Mr. White admitted that it would take sixty to
seventy feet to stop the locomotive at the time and
place in question. (R. 199, 220) White also stated
that after the rear end of the locomotive passed the
switch some 64 feet north of the intersection, he could
no longer see the crossing watchman from his position on the right side of the cab. (R. p. 213, 206.)
Mr. Bond testified (R. 243, 244) that after the locomotive started down from the switch he, Bond, didn't
"keep track" of the watchman-"didn't have time to
watch him all the time"-and never saw him again
after he gave the proceed signal when the locomotive
\vas at the northernmost switch.
If White and Bond can without any help from
the crossing watchman safely bring the locomotive
backwards into the intersection by maintaining a diligent and reasonable lookout, there may be no negligence in failing to provide White with a fireman on
the left side of the cab who can see the watchman, or
in Bond failing to observe the watchman and his
signals. But here the facts seem to be that the train
requires at least sixty to seventy feet (or ninety-one
feet) to stop; that if Bond was not negligently failing
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to keep a lookout, he did signal as soon as the automobile could be seen; and if White was not failing to
keep a lookout, he did apply the air brake as soon as
the signal was given-and yet the train could not be
stopped until it passed over the entire intersection.
Hence it is reasonable to suppose that only by having
Bond keep a lookout which included an observation
of the location and signals of the crossing watchman,
could the locomotive be safely brought into the intersection, and only thus could a reasonable lookout be
maintained. And in this case where Bond's observance of the crossing watchman would have revealed
that the latter was not stationed in the intersection
or giving warning of the approach of the locomotive,
Bond's lookout would have required a warning signal
to White of the absence of-the usual watchman. Thus
Bond's failure to keep a lookout for Walters, the crossing watchman-or the failure of the defendant to
provide White with a fireman in the cab who could
watch out the left side and see the crossing watch
man, could reasonably have been found by the jury
to be the proximate cause of the collision.
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DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO STOP THE LOCOMOTIVE
AFTER THE TRAINMEN WERE AWARE OF PLAINTIFF'S
POSITION OF PERIL

In vie\iv of the answers to Questions 13 to 18
(Br. p. 37), it is evident that the jury concluded that
neither plaintiff nor the driver of her car was guilty
of contributory negligence as they approached the
intersection. Consequently, the negligent failure of
the trainmen to stop the locomotive or blow the
·whistle after the plaintiff's position of peril was evident to them, we submit, is primary negligence.
If, however, the defendants' negligence in this
regard amounts to last clear chance as a matter of
legal analysis, nevertheless, it was a conscious and
actionable last clear chance, as follows:
As Appellants have stated in their Brief, p. 10:
"He (Bond) estimated that the automobile was 200 feet east of the tracks when he
observed it. At that time, the rear of the locomotive was about at the switch nearest Second
South. ( 64 feet from the curb.) Before the
rear of the locomotive reached this point, Bond
had no view of automobiles approaching from
the East. The moment he saw the automobile
he realized that it would be unable to stop
before reaching the tracks. He immediately
jumped off and gave the engineer an emergency stop signal."
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Mr. White testified (R. p. 199, 220) that with a
locomotive of this type and in view of the weather
conditions then prevailing, he could bring the locomotive to a stop within sixty to seventy feet.
From this testimony, the jury could conclude
that there was a clear and conscious opportunity to
stop the locomotive before it reached the point of
collision, which was 94 feet south of the switch
nearest Second South. Likewise from this testimony
the jury could find that had the whistle been sounded
when Bond claims he first saw the car 200 feet east
of the track, the p~aintiff's husband, driving in a
reasonable and prudent manner, as the jury found
he was, would have been given opportunity to bring
his car to a gradual and safe stop short of the tracks.
There was therefore sufficient evidence to warrant the submission of Questions 8 and 9 to the jury.
Rather than the situation in Van Waggoner vs.
Union Pacific R. Co. (186 P. 2d 293) where the Court
found that:
"Under the most strained construction of
the facts, the train crew could not have anticipated deceased's presence on the track until the
train had reached a point approximately 220
feet from the point of impact, and this was half
the distance necessary to stop the train * * *"
the instant case presents a factual situation
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where the train cre\Y did actually observe the presence of plaintiff when there \vas once and a half as
much distance as the crew required to stop the locomotive.
The Holmgren case, 198 P. ~d +59, 1s clearly
distinguishable on the san1e ground.

THE UNLAWFUL AND NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN OF THE
APPROACH OF THE LOCOMOTIVE

Under their point entitled "Alleged Failure To
Give Warning of Approach of Locomotive," Appellants have thrown together three arguments which
better lend themselves to analysis and understanding
when isolated and treated as three separate issues,
as follows:
( 1.) Did the train crew unlawfully fail
to sound the locomotive \vhistle before entering this intersection during a snowstorm?
(2.) Did the crossing watchman station
himself in the intersection or give a reasonable
warning of the approach of the locomotive as
required by the voluntary practice of the defendant railroad?
(3.) Assuming unlawful failure to warn
by whistle or negligent failure to warn by the
crossing watchman, was the alleged negligence of plaintiff's driver the sole proximate
cause of the collision and of the injuries sustained by plaintiff.
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(1)

Mr. White adntitted (R. p. 212) that he was twothirds of a block north of the intersection in a snowstorm and standing still with the locomotive when
he blew the only warning whistle before proceeding
to and entering the intersection; that the whistle was
sounded only in response to the proceed signal of the
crossing watchman, who was also acting as a switchman (R. 277, 278), that he thereafter waited one or
two seconds before releasing the air; consumed four
or five seconds in releasing the air; and then proceeded to the point of collision at five or six miles
per hour.
Respondent submits this would not satisfy the
requirement of Sec. 77-0-14 U. C. A. 1943, as amended,
which requires a whistle warning before entering
the intersection during a snowstorm.
Not less than 50 seconds would necessarily have
expired between the time of the whistle and the collision. At the time of the whistle, Respondent would
have been one and one half blocks away from the
intersection. So that a whistle so sounded would
not have been "before entering the intersection" nor
a warning to motorists of the approach of the locomotive to the intersection.
Mr. Bond's conflicting testimony merely raised
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a factual question \vhich it \Yas proper to submit to
the jury, as the trial court did in Questions 3 and Ll·;
and the jury could well find, as it did, that the failure
to give the required statutory warning was the proximate cause of the collision.
(2)

The record indicates that the crossing watchman's shack is 43 feet south of the south curb line
CR. p. 53, Ex. A.); that the crossing watchman, Mr.
Walters was also obliged to discharge the duties of a
switchman on this occasion CR. p. 260, 262) ; that
after giving the locomotive engineer the proceed or
high-ball signal when the locomotive was some two
thirds of a block up the street and standing still
CR. p. 259, 260), he observed Mr. Bond inspect or
check the switch at the locomotive, and being in
doubt as to whether he, Mr. Walters, had properly
lined the switches for the approach of the locomotive
to the station, (R. 277) he returned to the watchman's shack, set down his lantern, and proceeded to
telephone the stationmaster (R. 261, 278) and inquired as to which track it was intended for the locomotive to travel upon (R. 262, 279).
When he finished this conversation, he picked
up his lantern, turned it on (R. 266) and stepped
outside of the shack. He observed the Lodder car
approaching (R. 264, 280, 281) and walked toward
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
the intersection swinging his lantern to warn of the
approach of the locomotive (R. 282). Upon receiving
the proceed signal from Walters, Mr. White waited
one or two seconds and then received the go ahead
signal from Mr. Bond. ( R.208) The locomotive then
proceeded at either five or six, or seven or eight miles
per hour without further stopping and without sounding the whistle right up to the point of the collision.
(R. 212, 213) This was a distance of approximately
300 feet. (R. 212, 213) It would have taken altogether less than one minute. During this interval
Walters observed the movement, turned and entered
his shack, telephoned the stationmaster, explained his
problem, got his answer, picked up his lantern,
turned it on, and then began to signal to warn of the
approach of the locomotive by walking toward the
middle of the street which was 89% feet away CR.
282) and was still walking toward the middle of the
street when the collision occurred (R. 283).
The plaintiff and her husband both testified that
there was no watchman in the intersection, no warning given, and that had he been there or had the
warning been given, they would have seen it. {R. 70,
153) Plaintiff did see a red light which was apparently the watchman's lantern when it was stationary off at the south side of the road by the watchman's shack, and formed the conclusion that it was
a warning of an excavation. (R. 158)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
It is subn1itted that iu view of the forl'going physical facts of tin1e aud space plus the testimony of the
plaintiff and her husband, coupled with the evasive
and inconsistent testimony of Mr. Walters (R. 282),
the jury could well conclude as it did, that "the
watchman or flagman negligently failed to be
stationed in the intersection or that he negligently
fialed to signal the plaintiff or the driver of her
car that a locomotive was approaching the intersection," and that "such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries ... suffered by plaintiff."

(3)
Appellants next contend that notwithstanding
the foregoing evidence of unlawful and negligent
misconduct on the part of the railroad and its servants,
nevertheless the sole proximate cause of the collision
was the alleged negligence of Mr. Lodder, the driver
of the car. This contention is not only clearly at
variance with the facts, but is squarely refuted by
the findings of the jury. (R. 353: Questions No. 3,
4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.)
With considerable disregard for the record, Appellants state at p. 19 of their brief that "The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the driver of the
automobile . . . approached the crossing at an unlawful and negligent rate of speed." This unjustified
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conclusion is apparently predicated not upon any evidence of speed or failure of the Lodders to keep a
lookout, but solely upon the fact that when Mr. Lodder was suddenly confronted by the appearance of
the locomotive as it came from behind the buildings
which obstructed his view, he was required to apply
his brakes suddenly and violently so that his car
skidded on the ice. The argument completely neglects the fact that had the defendants given a reasonable warning, the car would have been braked and
slo,Yed gradually so as to have stopped in a reasonable distance and prior to entering upon the tracks.
Indicative of this fallacious analysis of the facts
is Appellants' unwarranted assertion that "it (the
car) did not stop even when it struck the locomotive.
It continued in another direction for an additional
distance of 36 feet." The clear fact is that the car
struck the locomotive with so little force that it did
not rebound or careen away, but stopped and was
then dragged by the locomotive alongside the track
36 feet and that the locomotive thereafter proceeded
an additional distance of some 27 feet before it
itopped ( R. 196, 252).
Appellants also make the unwarranted claim
(Br. p. 19) that the car slid on the snow arid ice a
distance of 60 feet before "crashing" into the locomotive, whereas in fact the officer's measurement shows
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only 45 feet of sliding if 15 feet is properly deducted
for the length of the car (R. 252).
Mr. Lodder testified that because of the snowstorm he had put on his chains (R. 63); that he had
come to a full stop only one block before this intersection (R. 65); that he had his windshield wipers
in good working condition and his lights burning
CR. 64); that he and his wife were not talking nor
was the radio going ( R. 69 64) ; that he was keeping
a careful lookout and also listening for an audible
warning (R. 69, 87, 88); that the windshield was
clear CR. 69); that the maximum speed attained between 3rd west and 4th west (the intersection of the
tracks) was 15 miles per hour (R. 65); that as he
approached the tracks he took his foot off the accelerator to more or less coast to the crossing (R. 69);
that he was within four or five car lengths from the
tracks when he first had any warning of the approach of the locomotive and that was by observing
its black end suddenly loom up from behind the
building at the north-east corner of the crossing
CR. 69); that he immediately tried to get away from
the train, but that because it came from behind the
buildings without any warning,he did not have time
to turn or stop before it was upon him CR. 70); that
notwithstanding he was required to suddenly bring
his car to a stop, he managed to slow down to two to
five miles per hour before the collision CR. 73); that
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his wife, the plaintiff, saw the locomotive only a
second after he did and warned that they were going
to hit, but it was already too late to do anything
about it (R. 92, 93).
The plaintiff, Mrs. Lodder, testified that though
it was snowing, -the car had been equipped with
chains (R. 150); that the car was not going over 15
miles per hour (R. 152); that she knew her husband
was a careful and competent driver (R. 151); that
the defrosters and windshield wipers were working
(R. 152); that she had her eyes on the road and was
watching the crossing CR. 153); that though she
was looking and listening she saw no signals and
heard no warning (R. 153); that there were other
automobiles parked along the north curb just prior
to the intersection which partially obstructed the
view (R. 154); that the "big red beer joint" on the
northeast corner of the intersection also obstructed
the view (R. 155); that she first sensed danger when
she saw a big black "mountain" of darkness moving
from behind the building and immediately warned
her husband by crying out, "We're going to hit,
aren't we?" (R. 156); that when the train was first
visible to her, their car was too close to the tracks
to do anything (R. 170); that her husband had
shifted into second gear a split second before she was
able to warn him (R. 171); that she was not conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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scious of the car sliding, but only of the train coming
toward her before the collision ( R. 172).
With regard to the crossing watchman, plaintiff
and her husband testified that they were familiar
with the crossing and had crossed it many times
(R. 66, 150); that they knew that generally when a
train approached this particular intersection a watchman would come out with a sign in the daytime or a
lantern at night (R. 66, 150); that when the watchman was off duty, the cover was removed' from a
sign on the cross arm so that it stated, "Watchman
Off Duty" (R. 67, 68); that at the time of the accident, the sign was covered so as to indicate that the
watchman was on duty ( R. 100) ; that although they
were looking for a watchman at the crossing, they
saw none and received no signal from a watchman
<R. 88, 153); that Plaintiff saw a red light over toward
the watchman's shack, off to the side of the road,
that the light was not moving, and that it was apparently protecting an excavation (R. 158).
Quite to the contrary of Appellants' unreasonable assertion that "Had it (the car) not struck an
immovable object it would hav.e continued on its
course indefinitely until its momentum was expended," ( Br. p. 19) this testimony plus the physical
facts clearly demonstrate that Mr. Lodder slowed
the car from some ten or twelve miles per hour down
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to a speed of two to five miles per hour within a
distance of forty-five feet. There can be little question but that had he received the warning to which
he was entitled either from the locomotive whistle
or from the crossing watchman, he would have
brought his car to a safe stop before reaching the
tracks. And Mr. Ladder's testimony as to this material reduction in speed is corroborated by the physical facts that the car did not rebound or careen off
from the locomotive, did not smash itself inextricably
into the underpinnings of the locomotive, nor damage
the locomotive other than by slightly bending the
stirrup at the point of impact. (R. 196, 93, Ex. 2).
Unlike any of the cases relied upon by Appellants (Brief p. 20 to 34), it is clearly demonstrated
that Mr. Lodder was conscious of the icy condition
of the road, had attached his chains, slowed his
speed, and was keeping a sharp lookout, and that
he acted promptly and reasonably to stop his car
as soon as any warning was available. The trial
court and jury could not conclude otherwise than
that the whistle warning required by law, or the
signal warning required by the railroad and its
watchman by reason of the practice voluntarily established by them, would have been promptly acted
upon by Mr. Lodder so that he would have braked
his car to a gradual and safe stop. It is not only
possiple (Br. p. 22) butinescapable that the warnings
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or either of then1 '\yould have enabled the driver to
stop before the collision."
Respondent sincerely subn1its that in the light
of the foregoing evidence a legal decision holding
that plaintiff and her husband approached this intersection in such a manner as to be guilty of negligence
as a matter of la'v which constituted the sole proximate cause of the collision, would be tantamount to
a ruling that all motorists must either approach and
cross railroad tracks within the city strictly at their
own peril notwithstanding the railroad unlawfully
and negligently fails to give the required warning,
or alternatively turn around at such crossings and
return home to legal safety.

* * * * *
At this point in their Brief (Br. p. 20 to 34)
Appellants cite and rely upon a series of cases some
of which by quotation out of context appear on the
surface to support their contention as to sole proximate cause. For the assistance of the Court, Respondent submits the following analysis of those cases.

In Lynch v. Pa. R. Co., 48 Ohio App. 295, 194
N. E. 31, the driver went 25 to 30 miles per hour on
an extremely slippery oiled road toward a railroad
intersection at which visibility was unimpaired. He
made no attempt to stop·until he was within 25 feet
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of the crossing and was then unable to stop because of
the condition of the street. There was no question as
to the adequacy of the warning supplied by the railroad, and the court concluded that such conduct was
"sheer madness." Quite the contrary of the instant
case, there was nothing in the cited case which would
have warranted the court or jury in believing that
further warning from the railroad would have induced the driver to earlier apply his brakes.
In Lavallee v. Boston and Maine R. R. Co., 89
N. H. 323, 197 A. 816, (Br. 23) the case goes off on
the same basis as the Lynch case, to wit, the statutory
warning would not have been effective to induce the
driver to sooner slacken his speed or stop his truck.
This conclusion was inescapable from the peculiar
facts of the case, namely, that the truck was 350
feet from the crossing when the train was at the
whistle post, the truck was then at least 216 feet
the other side of a crest in the road which obscured
the visibility of the crossing, and "it could not reasonably be inferred (from these facts) that if the
truck driver had then heard a whistle he would at
once have stopped his truck in order to avoid a collision with a train, which was then invisible upon a
crossing approximately 350 feet away." We submit
that the evidence in the instant case indicates that
had he been given the timely warning required of
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the defendants, Mr. Ladder would have at once commenet'd to stop his car.
The facts in the case of Umlauft v. C.M. & St.
P.R. R., 233 \'Vis. 291, 289 N. W. 623, (Br. p. 25-27)
are in no \Yay parallel to the facts of the instant case.
There the driver approached the crossing at 25 to 30
m.p.h. instead of 10 to 15 m.p.h., he had clear visibility of ++2 feet at a distance· of 100 feet from the
track, there was no claim of unlawful or negligent
failure to warn of the locomotive's approach, the
driver proceeded to within 75 feet before applying his
brakes notwithstanding the icy condition of the road
and the clear view of the train which was moving at
40 m.p.h., there was no evidence that the driver
slackened his speed before the impact, and the only
claim of negligence was that if the train had been
going at 1-5 m.p.h. as required by law, the car would
have slid across the track in front of the train fnstead
of hitting the second car. The excessive speed of the
train was held not to have been the cause of the
accident since it was entirely speculative whether
under these circumstances the train would not have
struck the car had the train been proceeding at only
1S m.p.h. as required by law.
Davis v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co. 241 Mich. 166,
216 N.W. 424 (Br. p. 21) relies on the case of Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48
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S. Ct. 24, 72 L. Ed. 167, which announced the strict
rule of getting out of the car and going forward to
view the tracks, which case was abrogated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Pokora v.
Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98, 54 S. Ct. 580, 78
L. Ed. 1149. The Pokora case was cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Toomer's Executor v. Union Pac. R. Co.
Utah , 239 P. 2d 163.
In Carlin v. Thompson, 234 Iowa 469, 12 N. W.
2d 224, (Br. p. 21) the driver had 300 feet of visibility, travelled at 45-50 miles per hour, and there
was no issue of failure to give reasonable warning of
the approach of the train. Here, again, the driver
approached the crossing at an unreasonable rate of
speed without in any way being so induced by the
negligence of the railroad in failing to warn of the
approach of the train. In the instant case, the Lodders were going only 15 m.p.h. and would not have
been going that fast had they received any due warning from the defendants.
This was substantially the situation in Boyle v.
Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 150 Pa. Super, 86, 27 A.
2d 682, (Br. p. 21) where the driver had 480 feet of
visibility, travelled at 35 miles per hour, failed to
slow until he was 25-30 feet from the tracks, and the
train was in plain view.
The next three cases relied on by Appellants (Br.
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27-3:2) are properly distinguishable on the ground
that in each of these cases the court properly found
that had a tin1ely 'varning been given it would not
have been acted upon by the driver of the car in time
to have avoided the collision because either he was
unaware of the slippery condition of the road, or
came upon the slippery portion unexpectedly. This
is the point of distinction ·which Judge Ellett pointed
out at p. 30 7 of the record.
The following quotation from Barrett v. U.S. R.
Ad1nin., 196 Iowa 1143, 194 N. W. 222, clearly indicates the basis for these decisions:
"As plaintiff approached the side track
crossing, she had the train and its schedule in
mind and reduced the speed of her auto for
that reason, so that she had it apparently in
perfect control. It would have been a perfect
control were it not for the icy condition of
the ground at that place and her ignorance
thereof. She had no intention of crossing the
main line without first looking to the west for
a train. She had all the time a clear view of
the eastand knew that no train was approaching from that direction. She did look to the
west immediately and did discover the train.
She was 40 feet away and mentally ready to
stop her car. The icy surface and the skidding
of the car were conditions which she had not
forseen or contemplated. These were the conditions which exposed her to the collision ... "
". . . The most that can be said is that if
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she had heard the signals, she would have come
to an earlier stop when she was farther away.
Can we assume, or could the jury assume, that
if the signals had been given, she would hav~
stopped her car farther away than 40 feet?
Why should she do so? , If conditions had been
in fact as she supposed them to be, she could,
readily, and would have, stopped her car after
crossing the side track. Would it have been
less prudent for her to stop her car 40 feet
away from the track than to stop it 60 or 80
feet away therefrom? . . . An automobile,
stopped 30 or 40 feet away is as safe under
ordinary conditions as if stopped 100 feet
away ... "
Hickey v. Missouri Pac. Railroad Corp. 8 F. 2d
128; and Stroud v. Chicago M. St. P. Ry. Co. 75 Mont.
384, 243 P. 1089, both of which are quoted out of context by the defendants, involve fact situations similar
to the Barrett case heretofore discussed, and both
rely upon the Barrett case as their authority.
Appellants' reference (Br. p. 29) to the Stroud
case gives an unfair interpretation of the facts in that
it is implied that the entire highway was covered by
ice, whereas the court found that "the proximate
cause of the collision was the icy and slippery condition of the planking on the crossing." The driver
was found not to be chargeable with knowledge of
this condition. The court found that the failure to
give the crossing signals in no way influenced plaintiff's actions in view of this circumstance.
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The defendants' reliance upon llaarstrich v.
Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 70 U. 5:32, 26~ P.
100 (Br. p. 32) involves a total1uisconception of the
problem involved herein.
In the llaarstrich case, the driver had clear
vision for 900 feet. The car \Yas traveling 25-30 miles
per hour. It could have been stopped in 40 feet. The
train was on the crossing when the car was 210 feet
a\Yay, and there was no reason the driver couldn't
have seen it had he looked. How can such a set of
facts be decisive of the instant case when no sufficient
warning vvas given to apprise the automobile of the
presence of the train which suddenly loomed from
behind the building? Obviously, it is not, nor are
any of the other Utah cases cited and relied on by
the defendants decisive of the present case.
Olson v. D & R. G. W. R. Co. 98 U. 208, 98 P.2d
944, involving a caboose with lights on blocking a
·street, succinctly sets forth the basis for the rule of
that case and the Haarstrich case in the following
language.
" ... the actual presence of a train on a
crossing is notice and warning to motorists
regardless of the absence or presence of other
warning signs or signals. . ."
By no stretch ·of the facts in the instant case can
it be said that the offending locomotive was on the
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crossing as notice to anyone. The evidence is to the
contrary that it was not visible until too late to avoid
the collision.
Hansen v. Clyde,
Utah
, 56 P. 2d 1366;
O'Brien v. Alson 61 Utah 368, 213 P. 791; Davis v.
Mellen, 55 Utah 9, 182 P. 920, involved highway
barricades, again obvious hazards visible in the road
ahead.
The difference between the line of Utah cases upon which defendants rely where the object obstructs
the highway ahead and its presence there is notice,
and the present case where the obstacle suddenly
looms up from the side of the highway is set forth by
Chief Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion in
Hickman v. Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah) 213 P. 2d
650, and constitutes a complete answer to the defendants on this point.
The cited line of Utah cases is also distinguished
in Earle v. S. L. and U. R. Corp., 109 Utah 111, 165
P. 2d 877. This is a case where the railroad failed to
sound its whistle until it was too late for the approaching motorist to stop. His only warning, as
here, was his view of the. train as it bore down upon
him.
The balance of the Utah cases cited by Appellants (Br. p. 33) are quite obviously without bearing
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on the present case. They are not helpful to the
Court and require no further consideration.

Ahnost the exact problem presented by the case
at bar was presented to the court in Saeugling v.
Scandrett 230 Iowa 153, 296 N. W. 787. The Court
distinguished that case factually from the Barrett v.
United States Railroad Administration case, 196 Iowa
1143, 194 N. W. 222, a case which was decided by the
same court, as \vell as the Hickey v. Missouri Pacific
R. Corp. case, 8 F. 2d 128, on the grounds on which
those cases have been heretofore distinguished in this
brief. Because the case is so parallel, and because it
also lays at rest the authorities relied on by the defendants in this case, by illustrating wherein they are
distinguishable, we take the liberty of quoting extensively from the case:
"Appellant relies upon Barrett v. United
States R. Administration, 196 Iowa 1143, 194
N.W. 222, and Pifer v. Chicago, M. St. P. &
P. R. Co., 215 Iowa 1258, 247 N.W. 625. An
examination of these cases distinguishes them
from the one before us. In the Barrett case,
the plaintiff applied her brakes within about
40 feet of the intersection. With her car in
the condition that it was, she could have
stopped in time to have avoided the train, but
for an icy stretch of which she was not aware.
"It appears, therefore, or at least the jury
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could have found that as she proceeded to the
crossing her reliance was in the brakes of her
car and not upon any signals. She knew that
a train was due to approach at about that time.
Her injury resulted from lack of knowledge
of the condition of the street. Acting on the
assurance that she could stop, she continued to
the point where she first saw the train and
then met with injuries she would not have sustained but for the icy pavement.
''In that case, as in this, the view of the
approaching train was obscured to within 40
feet of the track.
"In the Pifer case, the plaintiff was familiar with the crossing and anticipated that a
train might be along at that time and he intended to stop and reconnoiter before crossing
the track. His expectation of stopping and
looking was frustrated by loose gravel, the
presence of which he was unaware. When he
applied his brakes, his auto slid into the train.
The Federal case which appellant cites, Hickey
v. Missouri Pac. Corp., 8 Cir., 8 F. 2d 128, is
very much like the Barrett case and is not
controlling.
"To sum the matter up, we have the
plaintiff and her associates approaching a wellknown crossing on a pavement which they
knew would be icy and slippery. They knew
as they neared the track that a train was due
at any moment. They had the car window
down to permit the hearing of signals but they
heard none. The windshield was clear of frost
but because of the obstruction they did not see
the train until within 40 feet of the track.
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'"Under these circurnstances, we do not
feel that we should substitute our judgn1cnt for
that of the jury on the fact question whether
had the signals been given they would have
been heard, and being heard, whether the
automobile would have been stopped out of the
zone of danger. They had a right to assume,
until they had knowledge or notice to the contrary, that the signals required by Code, section 8018 would be given by the train crew.
'Vhat has been said makes it unnecessary that
\Ve should analyze appellee's citations. Agreeing with the trial court, that this is pr«;>perly
a case for the jury, its judgment is affirmed."
In Leavell v. Thompson, (Mo.) 176 S.W. 2d
854, the court had before it a fact situation very similar to the one at bar. The streets were covered with
snow and ice and were slick; the view was obstructed
until within 50 feet of the crossing. The train failed
to give any warning of its approach and when plaintiff discovered the train he applied his brakes. The
car skidded onto the railroad tracks. Said the court:
"We think that defendant's failure to
warn plaintiff of the approach of the train
contributed to the collision as, at least, one of
the proximate causes thereof. Plaintiff knew
that the road was icy and slick and was listening intently for the approach of the train,
which he knew was due, as he passed along
the obstruction that prevented his seeing its
approach. The jury could have reasonably
inferred that a sudden blast of the whistle
would have been heard, heeded and acted
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upon by plaintiff at that time. (citations) Ordinarily, the question of proximate cause is
one for the jury (citation), and in this case we
think it was a question for the jury to determine whether the failure of the defendant's
agents to give a timely warning concurred at
least as one of the proximate causes to bring
about the collision. Williams v. Thompson,
Mo. App. 166 S.W. 2d 785; Sisk v. Chicago
B. & Q. R. Co., Mo. App., 67 S.W. 2d 830.
" ... The evidence shows that the place
where plaintiff's car skidded was not only
slick but that there had been a large snow fall
in the vicinity. There was, also, evidence that
there was ice and snow on other roads in the
vicinity. In fact it would be a freak of nature
for ice and snow to be upon the road in question between the end of the obstruction and
the tracks and not appear anywhere else. The
jury could have inferred that the operators of
the train saw the general icy condition if it was
not, as a matter of law, their duty to see it.
(citation)"
In Williams v. Thompson, 166 S.W. 2d 785, under facts similar to those of the present case, that is,
prevalence of ice on the streets, obstructed crossing,
no signals given by the train, the car traveling 10-15
miles per hour, the driver and other occupants of
the car discovered the train and the driver applied
the brakes but slid on the ice into the train. The railroad advanced the same argument as in the case at
bar, the failure to give signals was not the proximate
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cause of the accident but that the slippery condition
of the highway was. The court said:
" ... It is obvious that defendant, as well
as plaintiff, was familiar with the snow and ice
on the street and the slippery condition thereof. Defendant well knew the hazards surrounding the crossing in question and that the
snow and icy condition increased the danger.
It is evident that the snow and ice on the street
played an important part in producing the
accident. It is also true that plaintiff saw the
approaching train in time to have stopped before going on the track had the pavement been
free of ice an snow. But there is no merit in
defendant's contention that the presence of
snow and ice on the pavement was a new intervening and efficient cause which broke all
casual connection between its negligence in
having failed to ring the bell or blow the
whistle, and the accident.
"Plaintiff and the other occupants of the
automobile approached the crossing oblivious
to the on-coming train which was hidden from
their view by the obstructions heretofore mentioned,and were about half way down the hill.
The evidence indicates that as soon as plaintiff
saw the train (all occupants of the car saw it
about the same time) the driver immediately
tried to stop the automobile ... "
The court then reviewed the testimony of the
witnesses, none of which was as strong on the question of reasonable care as that of plaintiff and her
husband in the present case, and concluded that:
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"It may be reasonably inferred from the
foregoing that if defendant had given a warning, such as the facts and circumstances demanded, the driver of the automobile could
and would have stopped on the level pavement
that led up to the office west of the tracks and
would not have reached a position of peril
from which he could not extricate himself as
the train approached. It cannot be said that
the snow and ice upon the street was of itself,
sufficient to cause the collision for if defendant
had given a warning plaintiff would not have
reached such position that the collision could
not have been avoided. It seems clear that
plaintiff was brought into her perilous position
by defendant's negligence. In such situation
an issue of fact is presented that should be
solved by the triers of fact. (citation)."
To like effect are the following cases: Jackson v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 211 S.W. 2d 931;
Hubbs v. Boston & M. R. R. 260 N.Y. 223, 183 N.E.
370; and Sisk v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., <Mo.) 67
s.w. 2d 831.
It is submitted, that in this case as in the Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Utah), 239 P. 2d
163, the automobile had a right to proceed under the
circumstances existing at the crossing, and that the
case comes within the rule announced in Hudson v.
Union Pac. R. Co., ____ Utah ____ , 233 P. 2d 357:
"Defendant contends the sole proximate
cause of the accident was the fact that the
automobile stalled momentarily on the track
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just before it was struck. However, a jury
could reasonably find that the failure to give
the warning signals, if such was found to be
the fact, was a proximate cause of the collision.
Nothing needs to be added to what was stated
by this court regarding proximate cause in Earle v.
Salt Lake and Utah Ry. Co. 109 Utah 111, 118, 165
P. 2d 877, 881."

Points II and Ill
SUFFICIENCY OF THE VERDICT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT

Appellants' Points II and III can better be considered together, for the reason that Point III is based
upon and relies entirely upon a conclusion reached
in Point II, which conclusion is not supported by the
law or the facts.
It is appellants' position (Brief, p. 39 and 45)
that the special verdict "is fatally insufficient to
support the judgment rendered." In this part of
their brief appellants do not raise the question as to
whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant or
support the findings.
Appellants' argument can be fairly separated
and treated in five parts:
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(1)

The first complaint (Br. p. 38-41) is that no one
single interrogatory asked the jury to find whether
appellants failed to give "reasonable warning to
motorists of the approach of the locomotive to the
intersection." Appellants seem to recognize that
Interrogatories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 12 were
submitted relative to this issue of warning and that
answers favorable to respondent were elicited as to
Questions 3, 4, 10, 11, and 12. Appellants argue that
for the trial court to concludefrom these affirmative
answers that appellants failed to give a "reasonable
warning," would be an inference of fact, not of law,
and would constitute an unwarranted finding of fact
in support of the judgment.
(a)

Appellants erroneously contend that their only
duty under the circumstances was to give what
amounted to a reasonable warning. (Brief, page 39).
In view of the facts as found that this locomotive approached an intersection in Salt Lake City
during a snow storm, the duty is not to give a reasonable warning, but the duty is that prescribed expressly by statute. Section 77-0-14, U.C.A. 1943, as
amended by Laws or 1943, page 124, provides in
part as follows:
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". . . During the prevalence of fogs, snow
and dust storms, the locomotive whistle shall
be sounderl before each street crossing while
passing through cities and towns . . . Every
person in charge of a locomotive violating the
provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and the railroad company shall be
liable for all damages which any person may
sustain by reason of such violation."
When the jury found that ( 1) ."in this case the
locomotive involved in the collision was driven into
the intersection of Second South Street with Fourth
West Street during the prevalence of a snow storm
without the whistle thereon being sounded just prior
to the entrance of the locomotive into the said intersection" and (2) that "this failure to sound the
whistle was a proximate cause of the injuries . . .
sustained by the plaintiff," and ( 3) that neither
plaintiff nor the driver of the car was guilty of contributory negligence, then there was nothing left
for the trial judge to do but apply the law. There
were no additional questions or issues of fact which
it would have been proper to submit to the jury as
to this matter. The test was not one of reasonableness, but was a specific factual test supplied by the
legislature. This is a matter of general statutory law,
not of ordinance, and was not required to be pleaded.
It was incumbent upon the trial judge to apply the
law to the facts as found. On this basis the trial court
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was obliged to find for plaintiff on the issue of
liability.
If the trial court had submitted an interrogatory (as suggested by appellants in their brief) as to
whether appellants failed to give reasonable warning
of the approach of the locomotive, we submit this
would have been error in that it would have been
the submission of an issue of law, not of fact.
See: 53 Am. Jur. 756, Sections 1090, 1091; 64
CJ 1166, Section 955.
(b)

Appellants contend that the findings with respect to the watchman and his failure to signal, "fall
far short of a finding that the defendants failed to
give reasonable warning of the approach of the locomotive." (Brief page 41).
It is not disputed that the appellant railroad had,
prior to the accident, voluntarily assumed the duty
of maintaining a crossing watchman or flagman at
the intersection in question (R. p. 16 and 21, No. 10).
It is also undisputed that the plaintiff and her husband, the driver of the car, were aware of the practice
of the railroad in maintaining a crossing watchman at
this intersection, had come to rely upon this method
of warning, and were misled into believing that no
train was approaching at the time of the collision
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by reason of the failure of the watchman to be stationed in the intersection and to give timely warning
of the approaching locomotive. (R. p. 66-68, 150151, 153, 172)
In view of this circumstance, the duty was not
merely to give a "reasonable warning." The duty
was that assumed by the appellant railroad-namely,
to give timely warning of the approach of a locomotive to the intersection through the medium of
the crossing watchman or flagman. Any warning
short of this warning would not, as a matter of law,
be a reasonable warning. Therefore, the court properly elicited a finding of an ultimate fact by its
Interrogatories No. 10 and 11. In response to these
questions the jury found "that there was a watchman
or flagman on duty at the intersection and at the time
of the collision" and that "the watchman or flagman
negligently failed to be stationed in the intersection or that he negligently failed to signal the plaintiff or the driver of her car that a locomotive was
approaching."
In view of these answers to Questions No. 10
and 11, plus the uncontroverted evidence as to
plaintiff's knowledge of and reliance upon the watchman or flagman, the trial court had no alternative
but to find the issue of negligence against appellants,
as a matter of law~
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As stated at 74 C.J .S. 1354 (Section 728) :
"Where a flagman is employed or a gate
established, the person in charge is bound to
perform his duties with reasonable care and
prudence, and a failure to do so is negligence
for which the railroad company is liable. It
is negligence for a gate keeper or flagman to
leave his post, knowing that an engine is
approaching, without giving some signal of
danger ... "
See to the same effect: 44 Am. Jur. 771, Sections 526 and 527, Restatement of Torts, Section 301,
Comment (f); 71 ALR 1160 at 1177, Bluhm v. Bryan,
193 Wis. 346, 214 N W364.
Respondents concede, however, that in view of
the findings that the bell on the locomotive was rung
and that the light on the south end of the locomotive
was burning prior to the collision, it might have been
error for the trial court to conclude, as a matter of
law, that the failure of the watchman to give timely
warning was the proximate cause of the collision and
of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The trial
court did not make this mistake of passing on proximate cause, but specifically asked the jury, in Question No. 12:
"Do you
evidence that
watchman to
or to signal)
injuries?"

find "Qy a preponderance of the
such negligencee (failure of the
be stationed in the intersection
was a proximate cause of the
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To \Yhich the jury answ£'red, "Yes."
Appellants do not con1plain that there were insufficient facts to '"arrant subrnitting the issue of
proximate cause to the jury. No doubt the fact that
the bell ''"as at the north end of a 120-foot unit (R.
p. 183, 185), \Yas separated from the street by intervening buildings, and that the small light on the south
end of the locomotive was not seen by respondents
but \Yas diffused in an intersection which was thoroughly lighted by t\vo sodium lamps. (R. pp. 54 to
56), and was also obscured by an extension on the
end of the locomotive (R. 218), warranted the court in
believing that the jury question as to proximation did,
in fact, exist.
(2)

Appellants further complain of the insufficiency
of the special verdict (Br. p. 42) on the ground that
Question No. 7 falls short of being a finding that
"the trainmen negligently failed to keep a reasonable
lookout for plaintiff's automobile as the locomotive
approached the intersection." The actual language
of the question is whether "the train men on the
locomotive negligently failed to keep a lookout for
automobiles crossing the intersection." This question
was answered, "Yes."
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Appellants' point seems to be that the duty was
to watch out for automobiles "approaching" the intersection, not for automobiles "crossing" the intersection. This would seem to be strictly a point without a prick. No jury could be expected to take so
narrow a view of the question.
As stated at 64 CJ 1185 (Sec. 974):
"A special verdict, finding or answer is
to be construed liberally with a view of ascertaining the intention of the jury. . . It must
be borne in mind that the jury may employ
a term in its common rather than its technically correct sense; and the findings should be
held to have the meaning that the average
juror would understand them to have."
Particularly when Question 7 is read together
with Question 8, it is evident that the finding is in
substance that the trainman failed to keep "the lookout of reasonable prudent persons under the circumstance."
"A special verdict, finding or answer is to
be construed as a whole, and where there are
two or more answers or findings, they are to
be construed together. Also, all the special
issues submitted to the jury for answers must
be considered together as a whole." (64 CJ,
Sec. 975.)
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(3)

Appellants further contend that Finding No. 8
does not establish that the train crew had a clear-cut
opportunity to stop the locomotive or give the signal
in time to enable the plaintiff to stop the automobile
and thus avoid the collision. (Brief, p. 43)
No complaint is n1ade by appellants in this section of their brief that the facts do not warrant the
submission of Question No. 8 to the jury.
'Ve submit that Question 8 and the affirmative
answer, particularly when read together with Question 7, is a specific finding that the train crew did
have a clear opportunity to stop or signal so as to
avoid the collision.
Apparently the real basis of the attack upon this
portion of the verdict is that the facts do not warrant
the submission of Question 8 to the jury, since there
is no evidence from which the jury could find that
the hostler was made or could have been made aware
of the approach of the automobile sufficiently early
to sound a warning whistle which would have been
"a benefit to either the driver or the plaintiff."
The blowing of the whistle "after it was apparent to the trainmen or should have been apparent
to a reasonable prudent person that the driver of the
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fore driving into the path of the locomotive" is not as
appellants would lead the Court to believe, the same
thing as a question whether the whistle could have
been blown "after the train crew saw the peril of the
auton1obile" and "it was much too late to afford any
benefit to either the driver or the plaintiff." (Brief,
p. 44)
Under the evidence which went to the jury (R.
p. 233) the jury could have concluded that Mr.
White, the hostler, was given a signal when the
automobile was 200 feet east of the tracks. A whistle
signal at that point might very well have been sufficient to give the driver timely warning of the approach of the locomotive so that he could have
brought his car to a slow and gradual stop, notwithstanding the presence of the ice.
(4)
It will be evident to the Court from the fore-

going that Respondent contends and represents that
the special verdict was, in all particulars, sufficient
as a matter of fact to support the judgment rendered.
Respondent believes she has demonstrated the following:
( 1) The answers to Question 3, 4, 10, 11, and
12 establish that defendants failed, as a matter of
fact, to give the whistle warning of the approach of
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the locmnotive to the crossing 'vhich was required by
the statute, in the one instance, and the flagman
warning which was required by the voluntarily
adopted practice of the defendants, in the other
instance.
r,7-Jl\1J

( 2) That the answers to Questions 8 and 9 establish that the trainmen failed to keep the lookout
of a reasonable, prudent persons under the circumstances.
(3) That the answers to Questions 8 and 9
further established that the trainmen failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision by giving
a tirnely whistle warning after a reasonable lookout
did disclose to them that the automobile was 200 feet
east of the track and when such a warning would
have permitted the driver to bring his"· car to a
gradual and safe stop short of the tracks.
( 4) That the answers to Questions 8 and 9
established that the trainmen failed to exercise reasonable care by stopping the locomotive in time to
avoid the collision.
( 5) That the answers to Questions +, 9, and 12
establish that the foregoing negligence of the trainnlen was the proximate cause of the collision and of
the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
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It is evident therefore, that the trial court was
not obliged to imply any findings of fact to support
the judgment. Hence, the argument of appellants'
Point III, to the effect that "no finding in support of
the judgment can be i1nplied," is beside the point and
raises an issue of law which has no applicability in
this case.

However, the Court may be interested in an
analysis of Rule 49 (a) and of appellants interpretation
and application thereof as developed on pages 48 and
49 of their Brief, wherein certain Texas authorities
are cited and relied upon.
The Texas cases have reference to entire omitted
issues and separate defenses rather than to additional
findings which may be a part of and related to
existing issues or defenses. The correct application of
URCP 49 (a) is to be found in the case of Hinshaw
vs. New England Mutual Life Insurance Company,
104 Fed. 2d 45, in which case Federal Civil Rule
49 (a) was construed to mean exactly what it says:
"If ... the court omits any issue of fact
raised by the pleadings or evidence, each party
waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue
so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to an
issue omitted without such demand, the court
may make a finding, or if it fails to do so, it
shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment on the special
verdict.''
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Respondent sub1nits that a Texas decision 111ore
helpful and n1ore pertinent is the case of'Panhandle
and S. R. Ry. Co. z:s. Friend <.Tex.), 91 S\V 2d, 922.
In that case the court ruled that
" ... where issues are subn1itted which are
clearly referrable to a specific ground of recovery, it is the manifest purpose of the statute
that on1issions in the charge will be supplied
by presumptioon of finding, when there is
supporting evidence."
Appellants refer at page 45 of their Brief to Section 104-25-1, UCA 1943, which defines a special verdict in a manner which apparently they claim is
favorable to them. This section was superseded January 1, 1950, by Rule 49 URCP (see U.R.C.P. Table I,
p. 183, and Table III, p. 18), and thus the statute
could have neither controlling nor persuasive effect
herein. Rule 49 gives complete support to respondent's postion. If appellants must rely on Section 10425-1 to sustain their position, then that position is necessarily without merit.

(5)
Appellants finally complain (Brief, pp. 50-51)
that (a) the trial court submitted a special verdict
to the jury without the parties having requested such
a procedure; (b) appellants were not given "any
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notice" of the court's intention to so instruct; and
(c) appellants were not given any opportunity to
prepare requests for submission to the jury "covering
any special issues."
(a)

Rule 49 (a) does not require that the special
verdict be used only when invoked by counsel. Quite
to the contrary, it expressly provides that "the court"
Inay submit written interrogatories and may require
a special verdict.
(b)

The record plainly shows <R. 307-8) that appellants were given notice of the trial court's intention
to submit special interrogatories; that both Mr. Jenson and Mr. Bagley did, in fact, make suggestions as
to the content of the interrogatories; that appellants
suggested that a question be submitted to the jury
which would permit a finding as to whether Mr.
Ladder's alleged negligent driving and the icy condition of the street were the sole proximate cause of the
accident; that the trial court quite properly ruled
that this suggestion would add nothing to the proposed interrogatories, since Questions 13, 14 and 15
squarely tested the jury's conclusions on this very
issue. Since the jury expressly found that Mr. Lodder did not drive the automobile "into the intersection
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

53
at a rate of speed that \Yas greater than \vas safe,
reasonable, and prudent, having regard to all surrounding circumstances then existing," or "without
keeping the same lookout which a reasonably prudent
person \vould have kept under the same circumstances then existing," it is extremely difficult to see
how appellants could possibly be prejudiced if this
\Yas the only suggestion they had for a further issue.

Appellants made no further requests or suggestions for interrogatories, excepting to remind the
court that, in their opinion, there were no issues of
fact whatsoever which should be submitted to the
jury. This had already been covered by their request
for directed verdict. Appellants did not ask for time
or other opportunity to consider further the special
verdict.
Appellants' position throughout this case demonstrates a thorough failure to distinguish the situation
wherein the driver of an automobile, either not knowing of the ice or coming upon it at the last minute,
would not have slowed earlier had he been timely
warned, as against the situation here presented,
where the driver knew he was on ice, was driving
with regard for this very circumstance, and would
have commenced to brake and slow earlier and with
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adequate gradualness had he received the timely
warning which the railroad and its employees were
obliged to give. It is evident that the trial court
perceived this very distinction at this point in the
case, for, at page 307 of the Record, he responds to
counsel's suggestions for additional interrogatories
by pointing out that the presence of the ice would be
an intervening cause only where "ice is inserted suddenly when you are driving on a highway."
Since the trial court not only submitted the
proposed spec~al verdict to counsel for both parties
but, beyond this, warned them as to the effect of their
failure to make requests covering all issues (R. p.
307) and then fully and frankly discuss~d the coverage of the proposed interrogatories with counsel, it
can scarcely be error that appellants failed to suggest
anything further of merit. This is hardly the situation which was presented in Pittsburg R. Co. vs.
Smith, 207 Ill. 486, 69 NE 873, relied upon by
appellants (Brief, p. 51,) as even a cursory reading of
that case will demonstrate.
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Point IV
THE COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED ALL MATERIAL
ISSUES AND INSTRUCTED ON THEM

Appellants' contention under point IV of their
brief is that the court erred in failing to submit to the
jury the question of whether plaintiff was negligent,
and whether her negligence, if any, contributed to
the collision. The specific complaint is that the trial
court failed to submit to the jury the issue of whether
in the exercise of reasonable care the plaintiff should
have protested against the alleged unreasonable and
unlawful rate of speed at which her husband approached the tracks.
The answer to this contention may best be
divided into three par~s:
(1)
In answer to interrogatory No. 3, served by plaintiff on the defendant railroad, the railroad stated that
the negligence of the plaintiff upon which they relied
to defeat her claim was:
"The plaintiff, Merlene Lodder failed to
hear the bell and whistle warning of the approaching engine or failed to heed said warning and communicate the knowledge she had
or should have had to the driver at a time
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

56
when the said warnings were clearly audible·
plaintiff failed to look for or see or heed th~
approaching engine and communicate the
knowledge she had or should have had to the
driver so that he would slow up or stop his
automobile at a time when the engine was
plainly visible; plaintiff failed to maintain a
proper lookout as she approached the railroad
crossing and communicate timely warning to
the driver of the automobile."
No mention was ever made of a claimed issue of
contributory negligence in failing to tell her husband
to diminish an alleged unlawful rate of speed. Therefore, this issue was not raised either by the pleadings
or the answers to the interrogatories.
(2)
Question No. 13, submitted the issue to the jury
as to whether plaintiff's husband drove "at a rate of
speed that was greater than safe, reasonable, and
prudent, having regard to the surrounding circumstances." The jury by their answer indicated that
he did not fail to exercise reasonable care in driving
at the speed he did, and that he was not driving at an
excessive speed. This being so, Appellants obviously
cannot have been prejudiced by the court's failure to
submit to the jury a question as to whether plaintiff
should have protested the alleged driving at an
excessive rate of speed.
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(3)
The general issues of Mr. Lodder's alleged negligence both as to excessive speed and failure to keep
a lookout and plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence \Yere submitted to the jury by questions 13,
14, 1·5~ 16, 17 and 18.
Although the proposed special verdict covering
the issue of Plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence
was submitted to counsel for Appellants before it was
given to the jury, CR. 307) no objection was made on
this point, nor did Appellants request a more specific
interrogatory covering this aspect of Plaintiff's
alleged contributory negligence. It is hardly an
answer to this omission to complain that the trial
court undertook to submit the "issue" on its own motion, but did so imperfectly. (Br. p. 55.) Rule 49(a)
seems to contemplate that counsel have a duty to call
such imperfections to the attention of the trial court
or thereafter keep their peace.
In view of the answers elicited to these questions,
the trial court reasonably concluded that the jury
in fact found plaintiff not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to protest against the alleged excessive speed of her husband's driving. If the jury
concluded that the speed was reasonable it could
hardly have believed she had any duty to complain
or protest on this ground. Under Rule 49(a) the
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trial court had every right to so conclude, and in the
absence of Appellants' express objection to the interrogatory as proposed, it must be presumed that the
trial court did, in fact, imply this finding if it is necessary as a matter of law to support the judgment.
Point V
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE
QUESTION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE.

Appellants contend that instruction No. 2 relating to proximate cause, given by the the trial
court and set out in Appellants' brief at p. 60 is an
abstract definition of a legal concept which the trial
court failed to apply to any of the facts of the case.
This argument completely disregards and overlooks
the special verdict procedure under which the case
was submitted to the jury.
The instruction has direct application to interrogatories 2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18, and the jury
could scarcely have concluded otherwise. Rather
than failing to connect it to any factual proposition,
we submit that the court did an excellent job of setting it forth so the jury could see its application to
each of the interrogatories submitted to them. The
definition of proximate cause is set forth, and was
coupled with a series of interrogatories which set up
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the application of the principle defined. Nothing
could be clearer to the jury than this method of
instructing them.
Nor, do we read into the last sentence of the
instruction the conflict with the balance of the instruction which appellants complain of. To the contrary, it appears to be very clear and explicit.
As has been pointed out under point No. II of
this brief, the jury found that Appellants' negligence
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries
(Interrogatories 3 and 4, 7, 8 and 9, and 10, 11 and
12). The jury also found that plaintiff's husband
was not negligent in any particulars (Interrogatories
13, 14 and 15) and that plaintiff herself was not
negligent (Interrogatories 16, 17 and 18). These
findings provide a complete answer to th~ balance
of Appellants' argument (p. 63, 64) under their
heading, Point V.
Point VI
THE ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE JURY WERE ALL
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE

Appellants contend that certain issues were submitted to the jury unsupported by the evidence. This
is but a rehash of a part of their argument under
point I of their brief.
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The argument made refers to requested instructions No. 1 and 8, which were refused by the trial
court.
We have heretofore pointed out (see Point D
wherein the issue of negligence on the part of the
plaintiff's husband was properly submitted to the
jury, which is the point raised by defendants' requested instruction No. 1; and we have also pointed
out (see Point I) wherein the evidence supported the
submission to the jury of the issue of failure to keep
a lookout on the part of the trainmen and negligent
failure to stop the train. A claim to the contrary was
the basis for defendants' requested instruction No. 8.
We refer the court to Respondent's Point I for a discussion of the evidence in regard to these matters.

Point VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING APPELLANTS TO
THE TIME LIMIT FOR CLOSING ARGUMENT WHICH
THEY VOLUNTARILY AGREED UPON

Appellants' Brief (p. 67) neglects to inform the
Court that no time limit was "allotted" to or imposed
upon them for closing argument, but that by voluntary agreement of all counsel, they undertook to
confine their closing argument to 40 minutes to the
side.
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61.
It is ouly by reference to the Record ( p. 323-324)

that it becornes clear that the tin1e lilnitations were
self ilnposed by agreement of counsel..
The record also clearly shows that the trial
cotu·t then \Yarned all counsel, that if they were to
keep themselves within these time limits, they would
have to reserve part of their time to argue the question of damages if that became an issue as the result
of a special verdict favorable to Plaintiff (R. 324).
It is also clear from the record that when they argued
the question of liability, Respondent's counsel saved
some eight or nine minutes out of the forty agreed
upon. Appellants' counsel voluntarily elected to
consume their entire time in arguing the issue of
liability and apparently made the decision that by
so doing they could best present their case and protect their interests. As a matter of fact they consumed not only their agreed forty minutes, but exceeded that in arguing the issue of liability.
It was only when they were apparently sur-

prised by the jury's special verdict in favor of plaintiff, that defendant's counsel suddenly attempted to
retrieve themselves from this error of strategy and
created a situation in which the trial court was
obliged in fairness to the agreement voluntarily
reached, to insist that Appellants' counsel abide by
their agreement.
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This is not the situation presented in the cases
cited by Appellants in their brief at page 68. In
each of those cases the trial court imposed on counsel
without their consent or approval, a time limit which
was found to be unreasonable in view of the complexity of the issues to be argued.
The case cames closer to Ackerman v. Griggs,
(Cal. App.) 293 P. 115, 117, where the appellant
complained that the trial court refused to permit him
to continue his argument beyond the one hour set
aside for him, and the appellate court concluded that,
"This is a mater wholly within the discretion of the
trial judge."
The following language from Bell v. Kelly, 73
Cal. App. 189, 238 P. 719 is pertinent:
"In addition to the claim that the damages are excessive, appellant contends that
error was committed by the triaL court in restricting the time for argument by counsel before the jury to 35 minutes for each party.
The plaintiff and respondent was satisfied with
this allotment of time, and it is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial
court. We may not presume that a more
lengthy argument upon the facts would have
caused the jury to see them differently than it
did."
Incidentally, it is not quite fair to state (Brief p.
66) that Respondent's counsel argued the matter of
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damages ""at length." Since this point is raised, the
Court should kno\Y that not n1ore than four n1inutes
in all was consumed in the closing argurnent of
Respondent on the issue of dan1ages, and that all in
all, her time for argun1ent \Yas not fully used.
Point VIII
THE VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DID NOT
INDICATE PASSION, PREJUDICE, OR CORRUPTION

The only fair and helpful approach to this issue
is to compare the amount of the jury's verdict with
the evidence which went to the jury on the issue of
Plaintiff's bodily injuries. It is specious to approach
the question of reasonableness of the damages by
cmnparing the jury's verdict with the trial court's personal view of damages in a personal injury case.
This basic fallacy in Appellants' position is perhaps best demonstrated by three points, as follows:
First: In the case of Falkenberg v. Neff, 72 Utah
258, 269 P. 1008, this very Supreme Court reduced a
jury award by 70% for excessiveness without finding
passion and prejudice. Therefore to reason that
because Judge Ellett reduced Mrs. Ladders verdict
from $25,000 to $10,000, a matter of 60%, this Court
must conclude from this fact alone that the verdict
was a result of passion, etc., is to fly in the face of
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both reason and precedent. (Appellants do not include the Falkenberg case in their table at page 71
of their Brief.)
Second: The results that would follow from
such an inflexible and arbitrary ruling as that a
remission of 60% is per se sufficient evidence of passion etc. to warrant reversal, demonstrate the hollowness of the argument. Would any trial court hereafter in this jurisdiction ever express himself as to
excessiveness of the verdict even though he were convinced that a remission of 60% or more would work
justice, and that there was in fact no prejudice
evidenced by the verdict? Obviously not. In fact,
the trial courts would be extremely cautious in considering remissions of any substantial proportion because of the danger of falling within the unfortunate
doctrine of the Ladder case. Hence such benefit as
our system of jurisprudence derives from this accepted practice would be very much impaired and
limited. See Bennett vs. D.P. R. Co. (Utah), 213 P.
2d 325.
Third: If prejudice and passion is to be determined by comparing the jury's idea of damages
against that of a single trial judge, (rather than
against the evidence of injury), then we are actually
substituting a judge's test as to what was fair in place
of the jury's judgment as to what was fair. This is
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the reasoning process Appellants would have the
Court follow. Respondent subn1its it is a procedure
which con1pletely turns its back upon and ignores
the spirit and benefits of the jury system.
When the issue of damages is submitted to the
jury, eight persons of diversified background, temperament, and judgment, eight persons "of various ages,
occupations and experiences" (Adkins v. Zalasky, 59
Idaho 292, 81 P. 2d 1090) are available to measure
what is a fair damage figure in view of the extent of
the injuries and in view of the "present cost of living
and the diminished purchasing power of the dollar"
(Bennett v. D & R. G. Co., (Utah) 213 P. 2d 325, at
331). This is the right to which Plaintiff is entitled
when she demands a jury,. trial. It is denied her if
as Appellants contend, this Court must measure the
fairness of the award against the judgment of a single
trial judge who cannot be expected to be completely
free from a point of view conditioned by his own
individual background, experience, and temperament.
Surely no reasonable mind can avoid the conclusion that what must be done here is to measure
the verdict against the injury - not the verdict
against the amount of remission which the trial
court considered necessary to remove excess. See
Pauley vs. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 194 P. 2d 123,
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Incidentally,. the Court may be assured that
respondent was disappointed and disturbed by the
trial court's heavy hand in reducing this verdict.
She did not believe, and does not now concede, that
the original verdict was not justified by the evidence.
The remittitur was accepted in the belief that thus
an appeal would be avoided and that the plaintiff
would at long last receive some prompt monetary
assistance.
Having accepted the remittitur m lieu of a
new trial with its costs and delays, Respondent concedes that she cannot now complain of what is considered to have been art unreasonable and unwarranted reduction in the verdict. Hence this point is
not here cross appealed.

* * * * *
Parenthetically-there is an independent basis
upon which Appellants' argument in Point VIII must
fail, as follows:
Our Court is apparently among those jurisdictions
which hold that if the reduction required by the trial
court is sufficient to bring the verdict down to where
the resulting figure has eliminated that portion of the
verdict which seemed to have been the result of
passion and prejudice, then the error has been corrected, and in such a situation even though the original verdict can be said to have been so excessive as
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to have resulted fron1 passion and prejudice, the trial
court does not coininit error in refusing to grant a
new triaL This seen1s to be the reasoning of at least
two Utah cases, to wit:
Jensen v. D. & R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100,
138 P. 1185; Duffy v. U. P. R. Co., (Utah)
218 P. 2d 1080.
This doctrine is apparently recognized in Pauly
v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 123, at page
125.
Respondent does not at all concede, however, that
she must stand or fall upon the acceptance of this
doctrine. The burden of her position here is that
when the original verdict is measured against the
injury sustained, it is not excessive, but is justified
and warranted by the evidence, and that consequently no inference · (conclusive or otherwise) of
passion or prejudice can be predicated thereon.

* * * * *
Therefore the unavoidable task at hand is to
painstakingly review the evidence as to personal
injury,and to put in proper perspective the thoroughly incomplete and one-sided statement of the
record and unwarranted inferences, therefrom
spelled out in Appellants' Brief.
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Iu considering the following summary of the
record, it will be helpful if the Court will have in
mind that the accident happened on December 19,
1949; and the the Plaintiff's complaint was filed on
May 16, 1950; the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint was filed on February 26, 1951; and that
the trial commenced on December 7, 1951. (Appellants seek to n1ake some point of the Plaintiff's increased prayer for damages in the supplemental complaint as against th~ original complaint. The reason
for this increase will become quite evident when it
is shown that the true nature of plaintiff's injuries
was not discovered until after the earlier complaint
had been filed.)
Plaintiff testified in her own behalf as follows:
That she was in exceptionally good health before
the accident, and even quite athletic and had not
suffered from headache (R. 158); that she was regularly employed as a waitress at the Temple Square
Coffee Shop and earned an average of $35.00 for
wages plus $48.00 in tips every two weeks (approximately $175 per month) (R. 146); that as a result of
the accident she sustained a huge black spot, bump,
on her forehead, a bruised knee, and a gradually
stiffening neck which made her realize something
was wrong that night, but that it was too late to go
to a doctor (R. 158, 159, 161); that the next day she
went to Dr. Kimball's office where her neck was
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x-rayed, following which Dr. Kiinball immediately
sent her to Dr. Clegg's office (R. 161); that Dr. Clegg
immobilized her neck by putting her in a cast ( R.
161); that she ·was in the cast for a week or so, and
that when the doctor removed the cast, he put her in
a metal brace (R. 161, Ex. G.); she fastened this
brace to her neck in the presence of the jury, and
without Appellants' objection, to demonstrate the
awkward position in which it held her neck, chin
and head (R. 162); that she wore this brace for two
and one half to three months, night and day (R. 162);
that the brace "was uncomfortable to say the least,
uncomfortable night and day. You can't sit down.
You can't stand up. It's inconvenient. You can't
turn your head." (R. 162, 163); that during this
period she definitely experienced pain, but not headaches (R. 162); that after the brace was removed she
began to experience headache (R. 163); that during
the time she wore the brace she could not sleep
nights, took sleeping pills, but that they did no good
after awhile (R. 163); that after the brace was removed she returned to work, but found she was not
as well as before the accident, that her neck was still
stiff and her headaches started (R. 164); that she
felt that she tired more easily and rapidly, and did
not feel the same at all as before the accident (R.
164); that she started taking aspirin and then empirin
and then codein and finally phenobarbital (R. 164);
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that from these drugs she secured only temporary
relief but no let-up in the pain and headache (R.
164); that on July 14, 1950 she first went to see
Dr. Okleberry at the Salt Lake Clinic (R. 165); (she
was under Dr. Okleberry's care and observation both
by physical examination and x-ray thereafter until
June, 1951); that in June of 1951, he put her "right
back in a cast, right back where I started from"
(R. 165, Ex. H); that she wore this cast throughout
the summer of 1951 until Sept. 24, 1951 (R. 165);
that after the second cast was removed she did not
hold a steady job, but worked a few days at several
different cafes (R. 166); that at the time of the trial
she was still suffering pain "up the back of my neck
to the back of my head, and then even persists onto
the top of my head" (R. 166); that at the time of the
trial, "if I find myself turning quickly to the left
or to the right, I hear a banging click sound. I go
weak all over" ( R. 166) ; that she still suffered
headaches, but not quite to the extent as before
she went to Dr. Okleberry (R. 166); that at the time
of the trial she was unable to rest comfortably at
night, that her headaches continued at frequent
intervals, and were of such intensity that no matter
what she took to reduce the pain, they still continued
(R. 167.)
Although Appellants now complain strenuously
that the evidence of Plaintiff's injuries which went to
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the jury did not "'arrant the verdict, at this point in
the trial they made no effort to impeach or diminish
the foregoing testimony by cross examining Mrs.
Lodder as to the injuries, discomforts, pain, or headaches about which she had thus testified in detail.
The jury could not help but get the impression that
Appellants did not question that Mrs. Lodder had sustained the injuries and experienced the resulting
suffering to which she testified.
Mr. Lodder, plaintiff's husband, testified as follows: That before the accident, plaintiff was "in
good health. She was always jolly, just swell to
have around. She was in good health, and never
complained a minute of anything, and we got along
real swell." (R. 79); that plaintiff "never missed any
time at work. She liked her work and she was very
good at her work" and was one of the best waitresses
he had worked with (R. 79); that after the accident,
the plaintiff "didn't seem to be the same. She has
been irritable and a bit cross. She is always complaining of headaches, and her son get's barked at
once in awhile;" that "she is easily irritated. She
get's cross. She is fairly hard to get along with at
times. She was never that way before. She's not
herself. She's just constantly with those headaches
and having to take pills of so~e kind to take down her
headaches, and she's not the same person." (R. 79);
that at the time of the trial, plaintiff "is 'still cross and
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irritable, always has headaches, not as often, but
they are just as severe, and she is always complaining
a bout them." C80) ; "that she used to sleep very good
and fall right to sleep, but she's very hard of sleeping
now. She get's up in the middle of the night occasionally, and she doesn't rest well at all." CR. 80);
"that she wore the brace two and one half months,
all day and all night, she never took it off CR. 81);
that sometime "in June of 1951" they put her back
in a cast and she wore that three and a half months."
CR. 81).
Here, again, Appellants indicated by their failure to cross examine Mr. Lodder, that they did not
question the extent of Plaintiff's injuries or suffering.
Dr. Clegg testified as follows: That Plaintiff
first visited his office on December 20, 1949; that on
taking her history, he learned that since the accident
of the night before, she had experienced pain in the
upper part of her neck CR. 107); that he examined
x-ray's which had been taken by Dr. Kimball, and
took ten sets of x-rays of his own; that his physical
examination revealed tenderness to the touch in the
upper neck, limitation of motion and some muscle
spasm CR. 108) ; he identified Exhibit I as an x-ray
he had taken of the upper portion of plaintiff's neck,
March 21, 1950, and read it as showing a fracture
line in the ring portion of the first cervicle vertebrae;
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that from his x-rays hf' concluded that there had been
a fracture or break in the ring of the first vertebrae
of the cervicle spine (R. 109, 110); that he had
treated the fracture by putting plaintiff in a plaster
cast, and later a brace to support the neck, which he
had instructed her to \Year day and night and to keep
tight and snug at all times ( R. 110) ; that by radiograph on the 6th of February, he observed that the
fracture showed as much union as could be expected
at that time; that as of the 6th of March or shortly
thereafter it appeared that the fracture had healed
<R. 111); that while such a break is healing it is
always painful (R. 112).
Although Appellants attempted on cross examination of Dr. Clegg, and now attempt by argument
CBr. p. 77) to establish that some portion of the injuries sustained by Plaintiff resulted from her failure
to wear the brace at night during the latter part of
the period when it was prescribed, nothing in Dr.
Clegg's testimony, or in the testimony of Dr. Okleberry, as will be pointed out, supports this conclusion.
Quite to the contrary, Dr. Clegg stated that in his
opinion the fracture united as soon as could be expected, and Dr. Okleberry stated that the more serious
injury consisting of the sprained neck, the angulation
between vertebrae, the strained ligaments, the ruptured disc, and the traumatic arthritis (R. 134) were
not caused or in any way contributed to by this minor
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and inconsequential failure to follow to the letter the
prescription as to wearing the brace at night, if such
be the fact. (R. 135).
Dr. Okleberry's testimony on this point is at page
133 to 135 of the Record where he says, "I don't think
not wearing it (the brace) at night had anything to
do with the persistent symptoms."
Dr. A. M. Okleberry testified both on direct and
on cross examination at some length and covered the
nature of the injuries quite comprehensively. He
stated that Plaintiff first came under his care on
July 14, 1950; that he examined her neck condition,
took x-rays, and from those x-rays and the x-rays
taken by Dr. Clegg, co:qcluded that Plaintiff had
.sutained a fracture of the first cervicle vertebrae and
in addition thereto a sprained neck which was evidenced by ligamentous injury ( R. 116, 117) ; that
in taking her history he learned that her symptoms
which had continued from the accident on December
19, 1949, consisted of pain and stiffness in her neck
and headache; that she appeared to be in distress as
though her neck did paj~ ( R. 117) ; he prescribed
h~at and massage and the wearing of the brace as
much as possible; that she continued under his observation and treatment until April 27, 1951; that
during this period although she was wearing the
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iencing headaches of about the same intensity, and
had a catching in her neck when she turned her
head to the left (R. 118); that when he examined
her on April 23, 1951, her symptoms indicated that
she was probably developing traumatic arthritis or
showed early symptoms of a ruptured disc (R. 119);
that on April 27, 1951 he took additional x-rays with
the neck in a hyper-extended position to see if they
demonstrated any instability or excessive motion in
the neck joints (R. 119-120); that from one of these
x-rays (Ex. J.) he concluded that there was a slight
angulation so that the interpretation was that there
had been some injury to the ligaments surrounding
the third and fourth cervicle vertebrae and that
Plaintiff had some instability there, and that possibly
some damage to an intervertebral disc was causing
the recurring sharp catching pains in her neck ( R.
121); that he suggested a plaster cast, and on June
11, 1951, he applied the plaster cast; he felt certain
that the neck should be immobilized and the cast was
applied in the hope that the neck would heal and
not go on and get worse (R. 123); that she wore the
cast until September 24, 1951, when it was removed
(R. 123); that the foregoing symptoms did result
from a severe blow to the forehead or some other
sudden jar on a date as far back as December 19,
1949 (R. 123); that even while she was wearing this
cast, plaintiff suffered sharp pain in the middle of
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her neck anq pain and numbness in her left arm
which could be expected as one of the outgrowths
of this condition (R. 124); on October 23, 1951 her
neck was about the same with catching pain a few
times each day which never lasted very long, her
headaches had become a little worse and she began
to experience the headaches also on the sides of her
head and complained of a ringing in her left ear; that
she had about 25% less than normal range of motion
in her neck in all directions ( R. 125) ; that he examined her on Monday prior to the trial by a prior appointment made in October, and that she had recently experienced a bad occipital headache, neck
pain and a little more stiffness in the neck than she
usually had, also an audible and palpable click over
the back of her neck in the junction of the neck and
the thoracic part of the spine notwithstanding Plaintiff had "gone through about all the advice we could
think of to give her." <R. 125).
Dr. Okleberry then testified that it was possible
Plaintiff would require an operation in the nature
of a bone graft done across one or both of the joints
which showed instability and in which ruptured disc
material would have to be removed (R. 125, 126).
The Doctor's prognosis was that Plaintiff might
go on and improve "or at least not get any worse,"
but that she might suddenly get worse without any
known cause, and would be more apt to have trouble
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in the future than if she had not been injured ( R.
1:!6). That no operation would be required unless
the patient did get \Yorsc. (R. 126).
The Doctor testified that he had not known until
a few days before the trial that Plaintiff was in a
lawsuit and that he believed her syn1pton1s were objective in that they showed angulation, fracture and
instability; that these conditions would ""necessarily"
cause pain and headache (R. 130); that the condition
was not congenital but the result of trauma (R. 130);
that ""the sprain and the instability that were still
residual were considered the cause of the persistent
headache" ( R. 131 ) ; that the sprain was a liga:r:nent
as distinguished from a muscle sprain ( R. 131 ) .
At this point in the Doctor's cross examination
(R. 131) Appellants made an abortive attempt to
prove that Plaintiff's injuries resulted not from the
accident, but from the treatment which Dr. Holbrook
had given her and which had taken the form of a
stretching of the neck. The examination by Mr.
Bagley is as follows:
Question: "Doctor, do you or would you
recommend stretching this woman's neck?"
Answer: "No.
much.

It's already stretched too

Q. "It's already been stretched, hasn't it?
A.

"That's right.

This is one of those
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things that has been classified and extensively
known as a whiplash injury. Apparently she
received both; first a whiplash type of injury
and then a direct blow which caused her fracture. One or the other caused it, maybe both.
Can't tell."
Respondent submits that this testimony effectively refutes the Appellants' contention that the
permanent injuries resulted from a stretching by Dr.
Holbrook (Dr. Clegg's partner). The only fair and
warranted inference from the evidence, is that when
the Plaintiff's head was suddenly snapped forward
and then backward in the collision, she suffered not
only a fracture of the cervicle spine, but also the
ligament sprain which gradually brought on the objectively determinable angulation and ruptured disc.
Dr. Okleberry then further testified that during
the course of his treatment of Plaintiff, he had recommended that she attempt to continue with her work
because "many of these things last too long for people
to wait for them to get well and stay off work forever." (R. 131, 1932).
Dr. Okleberry concluded his testimony on the
cross examination by Mr. Jensen, as follows: (R. 138139)
Q. "Well, why is it that subsequent immobilization would help where it wouldn't
have initially?
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A. ··It isn't certain \vhcther it has helped,
not at all certain.
Q. ''Don't you thi11k she's in better condition now than she w(l.s at the tinH' when you
noticed the excessive angulation in those vertebrae?
A. ··1 kind of doubt it.
Q. ''Do you think that you're placing her
in a cast this sun1mer was a con1plete waste
of time?

A. ''Well, I don't know for sure.
0. "Well, now, in your direct exarnination you stated, did you not, that at this tin1e
that the condition of her neck had improved
and that further immobilization would not
help her.
A. '"Her neck would improve while she
was in the cast. It may not be any better now
than it was before we put the cast on ... From
the standpoint of her symptoms, at least, I
don't think she's cured.
Q. "Well, now, the only symptoms you
are talking about V\Then you speak of standpoint of symptoms, is her complaints of pain
and stiffness. Isn't that correct.

A. "That's right, plus one other thing,
this very definite, audible, palpable click that
she has in her neck, it didn't change that."
Mrs. Ovena Kalm testified as follows: That she
had known Plaintiff for over three years; that she
had w_orked with Plaintiff as a waitress six days a
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week at the Temple Square llotel (R. 141); that prior
to the accident Plaintiff was very healthy and energetic, didn't take time off, didn't complain about
illness or anything, had never complained about
headache, had been a very efficient waitress, one who
remembered her orders and was pleasant with the
customers ( R. 142); that after Plaintiff returned to
\vork in the Spring following the accident, there was
no comparison in her health; she was pale, she had
lost considerable weight, was in a great deal of pain
an awful lot of the time and Mrs. Kalm didn't even
see how she could keep on the job she was in such
severe pain so much of the time; that Plaintiff just
looked ghastly much of the time; that there were
times when "you would see her (Plaintiff) turn her
head just ever so slightly, and she would look like
she was going to faint." (R. 143).
This witness then stated (R. 143-144).
"She would become ghastly white and
just-well, you could tell that she was suffering from that pain, and there was one occasion
that I remember very distinctly that she was
clearing the table, and she was sort of leaning
forward over the table, clearing the dishes, and
she just seemed to go weak and pale and I
thought she was going to drop her whole handful of dishes. One of the other girls went over
to her and said, 'Merlene, are you all right?'
She seemed dazed and turned and walked into
the kitchen without even answering."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

81

Mrs. Kahn then testified (R. 1·~·+) that after the
·accident, Plaintiff \vas not a very good vvaitress and
she noticed particularly that:
". . . she couldn't reme1n ber her orders
at all. She 'vould go to the kitchen aud seen1
to have forgotten entirely \Yhat she was even
doing. She couldn't remember what one customer had ordered. It \vas hard on us all and
mainly hard on her because she 'vould get
confused."
On cross exan1ination by Mr. Lewis, Mrs. Kalm
testified that:
"I am anxious for Mrs. Lodder's health,
nothing else, and I can see that it has been
greatly impaired." (R. 145).

In summary, Respondent earnestly submits that
the foregoing evidence shows that the Plaintiff sustained the following injuriesz
1. A severe bump on the forehead which caused

a fracture of the ring at the first cervicle of the neck.
2. A whiplash or snapping injury which caused
a sprained neck that developed its objective symptoms some moths after the injury and become demonstrable by x-ray evidence of angulation o:r spreading between the third and 'fourth vertebrae, and by
an audible and palpable clicking and catching.
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3. A ligamentous InJury, traumatic arthritis,
and ruptured disk in the same area.
4. Severe and prolonged discomfort amounting
to physical suffering as the result of wearing the
first cast and, thereafter, the metal brace for a period
of nearly three months, and the second cast for a
period of nearly four months.
5. Extreme and prolonged pain and suffering as
the result of the direct pain in the neck, particularly
at times of catching, but, more importantly, because
of the resulting headaches which were of such
intensity as to be beyond the reach of normal sedatives.
6. A resulting loss of weight, inability to sleep,
consequent emotional upset and disturbance resulting
in both a change of personality, change of attitude
toward her husband and child, and also an inability
to continue successfully with her employment because of loss of m,emory, impaired general health,
recurring severe headaches, limitation of motion in
the neck and head, and an extreme catching pain accompanying any unusual motion.
7. Special damages by way of loss of wages and
medical expenses amounting to $1,466.50.
8. A neck injury of such permanence that, at
the time of trial two years after the accident, and
after following the advice and prescription of the best
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orthopedic surgeon in the intermountain country for
a period of 18 months, including the wearing of the
second cast for 4 months, plaintiff was not cured,
and her doctor could state only that at least he hoped
she would not get worse and would not require an
operation to remove the injured ligament and disc
material.
From the foregoing, Respondent submits that
the jury was warranted in awarding a verdict of
$25,000 to the Plaintiff as a reasonable sum to compensate her for her injuries and losses; that such an
award is fair and reasonable in view of the evidence
as to injury and loss; and that such a verdict, in view
of all the evidence, ''is not so grossly excessive and
disproportionate to the injury that the court can say
from that fact alone that as a matter of law the verdict must have been arrived at by passion or prejudice." It did not shock the conscience of eight
tried and true jurors. It does not shock the conscience of Respondent, and should not indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury
to any person who fairly and patiently reviews the
evidence on which the jury based its verdict.
Respec;tfully submitted,

OWEN&WARD
THATCHER & YOUNG
Atorn~ys for Respondent.
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